skeptical theism is a type of reply to arguments from evil against God’ s existence. The skeptical theist declines to accept a premise of some such argument, professing ignorance, for example, about whether God is justified in permitting certain evils or about the conditional probability that the world contains as much evil as it does, or evils of a particular sort, on the hypothesis that God exists. skeptical theists are thus not supposed to be skeptical about theism; rather, they are theists who are skeptical about something else. But that raises the question of exactly what else. In particular, does skepticism with respect to some claims about God and evil lead to a more pervasive skepticism? More precisely, is skeptical theism committed to additional skepticism about God? Is skeptical theism committed to global skepticism, including skepticism about ordinary, commonplace beliefs? Or is skeptical theism at the very least committed to a broader skepticism about matters of morality? This paper takes up these questions.

At the end of the era when modern man claims superiority and authenticity and denies everything he does not understand or thinks he does not exist and sees himself as unrivaled in the field of existence and knowledge, a tiny creature called coronavirus cleverly challenges his entire existence. This article is concerned with the occurrence and spread of Covid-19 and its new variants as well as its unfortunate consequences in the world in the form of the problem of Covid-19. In this article, from the perspective of the skeptical theism, as an answer to the problem of evil, we will examine how this approach responds to the problem of Covid-19, and on the other hand, how the peculiar characteristics of this virus can strengthen the claim of skeptical theism.

In Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Hume seeks to refute the teleological argument on the basis of the existence of evil in the world. This paper addresses this main objection of Hume’ s. I will discuss whether a skeptical theist, in particular, is in a position to answer Hume’ s objection. The problem for skeptical theists is that Hume’ s objection to the design argument is structurally symmetrical to their solution to the problem of evil. I will argue that this structural symmetry can be specified in two ways, which I will call “ unknown reasons for the design” and “ ignorance of God’ s reasons” . I will argue that while the first symmetry is not threatening to the design argument, the second symmetry poses a serious problem for the design argument. Nevertheless, I will argue that a theist may be able to respond to the problem, provided that she weakens her conclusion sufficiently, and that she takes onboard certain assumptions.

skeptical theism is one of the theistic responses to the evidential problem of evil. This approach which is included of different ideas, with emphasizing on human cognitive limitations and complicated axiological reality, casts doubt on the claim of gratuitous evil. This article is based on Bergmann’ s idea, who is one of the prominent philosopher in this sphere. He challenges William Rowe’ s inductive argument with his skeptical theses which are based on “ representative” principle. Bergmann’ s articles in this sphere are influential and highly controversial. One of the main objections to his idea is that his skeptical theses lead to moral impasse, both in theoretical (moral justification) and pragmatic aspect. This is against our approach in our everyday moral life. Since this position is not acceptable in everyday moral life, skeptical theism is not acceptable either. Although Bergmann accepts limitations in sphere of value, he doesn’ t think it makes problem for skeptical theism. This article first introduce representative approach of Bergmann then considering objections and responses to them. At least it becomes clear that Bergmann’ s solutions does not response objections rightly.

Meister Eckhart is one of the Christian Mystics that Christian Orthodoxy and Catholic Church accused his thoughts in Medieval Ages and named him heretic. Most important themes that disparate the theism of Eckhart from his Christian predecessors are belief to Godhead beyond God, Denial of possibility of Knowing God, Innovations about Trinity, belief to apophatic Theology and etc. He defended of his beliefs against this charges, but because of his interior tendency, the theism of Eckhart is result of apophatic Theology of Dionysius and Neoplatonism and without Denial of Trinity; while accepting its function and essence in his preachers; regards Unity superior specialty of Godhead above existence and nothing.

William Rowe’s various works on the evidential argument from evil now occupies a central place in the Western discussions on the problem of evil. In one of his formulations, Rowe tries to justify the atheistic belief by showing the likelihood of gratuitous evil’s existence based on some particular instances of intense suffering. However, some of the philosophers, who are called skeptical theists, attempt to show that if there is a God, it is completely rational to accept that the humans are not in a cognitive position to make true judgments about all of the divine intentions and actions. Therefore, we cannot infer God’s justification(s) for the prescription of what seems to us to be an instance of intense suffering. Our aim in this paper is to show that skeptical theism offers a good reason to reject the evidential problem of evil developed by William Rowe.

One of the most important and challenging theories of Open theism is its particular view of the attribute of divine omniscience. This theory acknowledges that God is the Absolute, yet stipulates that God's knowledge does not include what man performs with his free will in the future. The acceptance of absolute authority for man and the embracing of the contradiction between the "freely chosen actions of man in the future" and the "foreknowledge of God" have led the Open theism to deny the foreknowledge of God in these acts. At the same time, they argue that the lack of “ a priori knowledge of God” in these kinds of actions does not undermine his absolute knowledge. Advocates of open theism, proving their own viewpoints by referring to all kinds of views on God's knowledge and expressing the deficiencies in these theories, maintain that this view is more acceptable logically and philosophically, and due to its compatibility with the Holy Bible. While mentioning the shortcomings of three other contending perspectives in this regard namely "simple knowledge", "middle knowledge" and "Augustinian-Calvinist view ", they consolidate their views and establish their own theory.

In this article the rationality of theism is studied in three important works of Plantinga; the three works in which the author, while responding to the critiques, presents his viewpoints. In this article, Plantinga's line of argumentation in these books is sought and then, his views are explained and analyzed. Hence, first his analogical argument is studied and criticized and then it will be discussed that there is incoherence in his critiques of the evidentialism and foundationalism. At the end, it will be also mentioned that his idea that the belief in God needs no evidence is a kind of Fideism.

The primary challenge in addressing the problem of evils is the limitation of human knowledge in comprehending its intricate dimensions. This challenge arises from the significant role that God is perceived to play in either causing or permitting certain evils. While human beings lack the epistemic capacity to fully grasp God''''s purposes and the manner of divine intervention, God is understood as omnipotent and omniscient. Consequently, the limitations of human knowledge prevent a precise and comprehensive understanding of the complex dimensions of the evils we encounter in life. Some scholars have referred to this perspective as skeptical theism. Advocates of this approach seek to counter atheistic arguments that reject God''''s existence on the grounds of the apparent absence of rational justifications for evils—particularly gratuitous evils. They argue that our epistemic limitations in discerning God’s reasons for allowing certain evils do not imply that such reasons do not exist. This study employs content analysis to demonstrate that, while emphasizing our epistemic limitations in understanding the problem of evil is somewhat effective in challenging atheistic arguments, excessive reliance on epistemic skepticism regarding divine intervention leads to a broader form of epistemic skepticism. As a solution, this paper proposes recognizing the diverse epistemic capacities of human beings, emphasizing the significance of a God endowed with absolute attributes, and utilizing these attributes to engage with the problem of evils.